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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
The question for decision in this appeal from dismissal of
the claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction brought in an
action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act is whether the
activity complained of comes within a recognized exception to the
Act.

The Plaintiff claimed that he slipped and fell in the

Ceremonial Court Corridor of the William J. Green Federal
Building and the Byrne Courthouse Building in Philadelphia
because a film of water and ice was on the floor at the entrance
to the building.

The Federal Tort Claims Act vests exclusive
jurisdiction in district courts for claims against the United
States “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act occurred.”
U.S.C. § 1346(b).
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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2671 explains that “Federal

agency” and “Employee of the government” do not include any
contractor with the United States.

Thus, there is an

independent-contractor exemption in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The district judge determined that any negligence causing the
injury was that of the independent contractor (who was brought
into this case as a third-party defendant), not that of the
United States.

Therefore, the court concluded that Plaintiff's

claim came within the independent-contractor statutory exception
to the FTCA and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.

We affirm the judgment of the

district court.
The critical factor used to distinguish a federal
agency employee from an independent contractor is whether the
government has the power “to control the detailed physical
performance of the contractor.”

United States v. Orleans 425

U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (citing Logue v. United States, 412 U.S.
521, 528 (1973)).

“[T]he question here is not whether the
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[contractor] receives federal money and must comply with federal
standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations
are supervised by the Federal Government.”

Id. at 815.

The

contractor here, Elwyn Industries, was given broad
responsibilities for daily maintenance.

The contract

specifically requires Elwyn to maintain an on-site supervisor,
and explicitly states that “Government direction or supervision
of contractor's employees directly or indirectly, shall not be
exercised.”

App. for Appellant at 74a.

Alternatively, appellant argues that even if Elwyn
Industries was negligent, the United States remains liable under
Pennsylvania law as the owner and possessor of the building.
There is a split in the circuits on this question.

Compare

Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1989)
(interpreting Florida law and holding the government liable),
with Berkman v. United States, 957 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1992)
(interpreting Virginia law and holding that independentcontractor exception precluded governmental liability even though
similar property owners might be liable under state law for
injuries resulting from unsafe conditions).

We believe the

Fourth Circuit offers the better reasoned analysis and we accept
it as our own. The Berkman court stated:
Thus, while Berkman is correct in his assertion that, under
Virginia law, the United States when acting as a
landowner must maintain its property in a reasonably
safe condition, Berkman must also show that federal law
permits the application of this law to the United
States. This he fails to do. The fundamental error in
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Berkman's reasoning flows from the fact that the
government of the United States can act only through
people. Furthermore, it is well understood that the
government's activities are not performed exclusively
by the government's employees and that independent
contractors and subcontractors conduct a broad array of
functions on the government's behalf. Thus, the FTCA
divides the universe of persons through which the
United States may act into two general classes,
“employee[s] of the government” and “contractor[s].”
See U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671.
*
*
*
[W]e find nothing in the language of the act or in the
legislative history of the FTCA to indicate that
Congress considered the existence of a generalized
liability, attributable to the United States based on
any breach of a state defined duty. By expressly
waiving immunity for the tortious conduct of its
employees and only its employees, the FTCA requires a
more focussed approach that requires the courts to
determine the relationship to the United States of the
actor whose negligence might be imputed to the
government under state law.
Berkman, 957 F.2d at 112-113.

See Gibson v. United States, 567

F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977).
We have considered all arguments advanced by the
parties and have concluded that no further discussion is
necessary.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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